Perhaps one of the more notable of these attempts to rehabilitate and revive Mercersburg Theology is Mark Horne’s 1997 PCA Taylor Aiken Award-winning paper in Church History, Real Union or Legal Fiction? John Williamson Nevin’s Controversy With Charles Hodge Over the Imputation of Adam’s Sin (with a Comparison to Robert L. Dabney). Horne currently serves as assistant pastor of Providence Reformed Presbyterian Church (PCA) in St. Louis, Missouri. Even this earlier week he expressed his “appreciation, maybe even admiration” for Nevin.
The bulk of his Aiken Award-winning paper is dedicated to one small aspect of the extended dispute between Princeton professor Charles Hodge and his errant protégé, John Williamson Nevin, the chief theologian of Mercersburg Theology.
Horne’s analysis of Hodge and Nevin on the imputation of Adam’s sin appears a fair representation of the vast theological gulf that existed between the two. It is worth noting that Hodge and Nevin had many other points of disagreement beyond this, such as Nevin’s rejection of Calvinistic soteriology (see Nevin’s second article on “Hodge on the Ephesians”, Mercersburg Review 9 [April 1857]: 192–245), and the Calvinistic view of sacraments (see Hodge’s extensive rebuttal of Nevin’s book, The Mystical Presence, in his article “Doctrine of the Reformed Church on the Lord’s Supper”, Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review 20 [April 1848]: 227–278).
But Horne does not limit his discussion to just Nevin and Hodge on this small topic. In order to qualify Nevin within the bounds of acceptable Reformed theology, Horne marshals none other than the great Southern Presbyterian theologian, R.L. Dabney, to verify Nevin’s Reformed credentials. Horne states:
“One reason for believing that Nevin belongs to the debate within American Presbyterianism is that Dabney seems to have articulated substantially the same view of the imputation of Adam’s sin.”Horne here admits that his purpose is to call on Dabney as proof that Nevin “belongs to the debate within American Presbyterianism”. As one of the most revered theological minds in American Presbyterianism (along with Hodge), Horne does well to cite Dabney. That is, of course, if the slipper does in fact fit.
It seems (not having read all of Horne’s citations for Dabney) that he accurately represents Dabney’s disagreement with Hodge over the nature of the imputation of Adam’s sin. I offer that as a given. But discussion of imputation of Adam’s sin without considering the corresponding soteriological implications for the believers union with Christ, justification, and imputation of Christ’s sin to believer, as well as any sacramental implications, could raise the response of “so what?” And any agreement between Nevin and Dabney on the sole issue of the imputation of Adam’s sin, a subset of theological interest, would hardly be the vindication of Nevin as within the bounds of American Presbyterianism that Horne intends it to be unless it extends to these other important soteriological issues as well.
In fact, in the conclusion to his paper Horne draws his evidence together hoping to build a final case by taking the seeming agreement between Nevin and Dabney on the issue of imputation of Adam’s sin and extending out that alleged agreement to those related soteriological implications. He identifies seven “implicitly or explicitly” held area of agreement between Nevin and Dabney:
In summary, this paper has attempted to make a prima facie case that both Nevin and Dabney share a view at odds with the “immediate imputation” of Charles Hodge, but not, as Hodge claimed in the case of Nevin, at odds with notion of forensic justification. They seem to have held, implicitly or explicitly, the following points in common against him:Now understand that Horne here has made the leap from talking about the imputation of Adam’s sin — almost the entire focus of the paper — to the added soteriological questions of union with Christ, justification and the nature of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. We discover at this point that this is where Horne has been leading us all along. The intent of his paper was not just to show that there was disagreement between Nevin and Hodge on the imputation of Adam’s sin, and calling Dabney in to verify Nevin’s view on that point; his invocation of Dabney is intended to vindicate Nevin’s entire soteriology, as Horne makes clear in the continuation of his conclusion:
- Union with Christ [51] is the basis for the justification of believers.
- This union is brought about through the power of the Holy Spirit at a certain point in time in a person’s life (regeneration).
- The inception of this union not only is the basis of justification, but the beginning of sanctification.
- This union with Christ parallels the union with Adam which all people possess.
- Whereas, in the case of Christ, the union is a Spiritual union (= through the Holy Spirit), in the case of Adam, the union is a natural union (= through the flesh).
- Whereas union with Christ is given to sinners who already exist, union with Adam is given by natural generation and starts their existence.
- Though the basis for condemnation in Adam and justification in Christ are not simply legal relationships, both the condemnation and the justification arising from the respective unions are essentially legal states. To elaborate, to be justified is to be declared righteous and to be condemened to be declared unrighteous. The legal character of such declarations is not compromised by the fact that they are based on realities which are not themselves reducible to forensic concepts.
The similarities between Nevin and Dabney, despite real differences in theological and philosophical perspective, should provide additional evidence that Nevin, whatever his faults, was not simply the quasi-Romanist as which Hodge attempted to portray him. The mere fact that Hodge’s depiction of Nevin as rejecting the Protestant doctrine of forensic justification was also applicable to Dabney should indicate a high probability that Hodge was defending his own personal preferences, not the truths of the Reformation. However Nevin’s views later developed (or decayed), and no one claims he changed substantially in this area, he did not say anything in Mystical Presence that justified Hodge’s accusation that he denied forensic imputation. (emphasis added)Horne says quite clearly that he is using Dabney to defend Nevin against Hodge not just on the isolated issue of the imputation of Adam’s sin, but Nevin’s entire scheme of redemption. It is at this point when Horne begins drawing out these conclusions that his case completely falls apart. Even more than that, Horne knows it. You only need to follow the link to the final endnote [51] of his paper, cited in point 1 of his conclusion, to see how he has rather conveniently buried the evidence against his final conclusion:
51. Dabney radically rejected Nevin’s understanding of that union, however. He wrote: “Now, I cannot but believe that the gross and extreme views of a real presence and opus operatum, in the Lord’s supper, which prevailed in the Church from the patristic ages throughout the mediaeval, and which infect the minds of many Protestants now, arise from an erroneous and overstrained view of the mystical union. This union effectuates redemption. We all agree that the sacraments are its signs and seals. (See I Cor, xii:13: I Cor. x: 17, et passim). Now, the Fathers seem to have imagined that spiritual life must result from a literal and substantive intromission of Christ’s person into our souls, just as corporeal nutrition can only result when the food is taken substantially into the stomach, and assimilated with our corporeal substance. In this sense they seem to have understood the eating of Jno. [sic] vi: 51, etc. (which was currently misapplied to the Lord’s Supper). Hence, how natural that in the Lord’s supper, the sacramental sign and seal of the vitalizing union, they should imagine a real presence, not only of the God-head naturally, and of the Holy Spirit in His sanctifying influences, but of the whole Mediatorial person, and a literal feeding thereon. Hence, afterward, transubstantiation and consubstantiation, and the more refined, though equally impossible theory of Calvin, of a literal, and yet only spiritual feeding on the whole person. The same general law of thought appears in what may be called the Pan-Christism of the “Mercersburg School,” of modern semi-Pantheism. These divines have revived the old mystical idea of the substantive oneness of the human and divine spirit, through the medium of the incarnation, consistently assert a species of real presence of the mediatorial person in the Supper” (Systematic Theology, p. 617). Nevertheless, despite their differing conceptions of union with Christ, both seem to have a similar use for the doctrine in discussing imputation — that “This union effectuates redemption.”I will freely admit that Horne has done the right thing at least by begrudgingly acknowledging the damning evidence against him here, but it isn’t surprising that it’s buried in the final endnote of the paper. The quote from Dabney here that Horne cites is taken from Lecture 51 of Dabney’s Systematic Theology, Union with Christ. Horne is forced to admit — in the endnote! — that “Dabney radically rejected Nevin’s understanding of that union”. It is important to note that the union discussed here is Nevin’s doctrine of the union with Christ. That Dabney rejected Nevin’s understanding of it is an extremely relevant point — much more than what Horne seems to make of it — because Horne still wants to contend that they share similar views on justification on the alleged basis of their two equated views on union with Christ (Point 1 of his conclusion).
The reason why I believe that Horne’s case is undermined entirely is that if Dabney “radically rejects” Nevin’s understanding of the union with Christ, not only does it eviscerate his conclusion in point 1 equating Dabney and Nevin’s view of union with Christ and justification; it invalidates their supposed agreement drawn by inference from that in all the other concluding points as well. One stiff blast of wind delivered by the Southern Presbyterian Dabney disassembles Horne’s tenuous house of cards and the supposed vindication of Nevin’s soteriology from Hodge’s attack.
With reference to Nevin’s mystical union, Dabney in the quote above calls it “Pan-Christism” and identifies it with “modern semi-Pantheism”. And Dabney makes his view clear with reference to the mystical union immediately following where Horne stopped his citation: “Let us disembarrass our views of the mystical union.” Which views of the mystical union does he tell us to disembarrass ourselves from? The divines of the “Mercersburg School”. And who does he have in mind specifically? None other than John Williamson Nevin, the premier advocate in Mercersburg of “mystical union”.
It is hard to think of a more specific rejection by Dabney of Nevin’s views at the very point at which that Horne argues they are in agreement. Not only does Dabney locate Nevin in the precincts outside American Presbyterianism; he places him outside the realm of Nicene Christianity altogether (unless Horne wants to argue that “semi-Pantheism” should be considered an acceptable expression of Christianity).
Other scholars have been more forthright than Horne regarding Dabney, Nevin and Hodge regarding their soteriological views. Emory theology professor E. Brooks Holifield offered this conclusion more than thirty years ago with reference to this theological trio:
Union with Christ. The phrase pointed to one of the revered motifs of Reformed theology, and neither Hodge nor Dabney had any desire to discard it. But for them the crucial soteriological category was “imputation,” and Hodge feared that Nevin’s language about the mystical union covertly substituted a theory of inherent righteousness for the doctrine that God graciously “imputed” Christ’s righteousness to the elect believer. It was manifest to Hodge that in Nevin’s system the believer received the righteousness of Christ by participating in his nature, which Nevin believed to be uniquely though not exclusively manifested in and through the sacrament. Hodge concluded that according to Nevin there could be no “imputation of either sin or righteousness to us, except they belong to us, are inherently our own.” But this, Hodge continued, was a terrifying notion, because our inherent righteousness, or rather our lack of it, deserved only divine wrath. Nevin denied, however, that he made redemption contingent on inherent human goodness; he claimed, rather, to have merely established an intrinsic “community of life” between Christ and the believer as the basis for God’s imputation of righteousness. Imputation was not groundless; its basis was participation in the life of Christ, but this did not imply any inherent righteousness in the believer. Nevin simply wanted to say that union with Christ was the crucial moment in the order of salvation. He wanted to affirm a relation of participation between the created, fallen self and the incarnate saviour, whose life had passed over to his people as the Church.Holifield cites the exact same lecture and quotation by Dabney as Horne, and yet associates him with Hodge rather than with Nevin regarding their views on union with Christ, justification and the imputation of Christ’s righteouness. He goes so far as to state: “Dabney agreed with Hodge’s charge that Nevin pushed the theme of participation to an heretical extremity.” While Dabney might have shared one theological aspect with reference to Nevin’s view of the imputation of Adam’s sin, Holifield notes that Dabney made one very crucial distinction when it came to applying it to union with Christ:
Dabney agreed with Hodge’s charge that Nevin pushed the theme of participation to an heretical extremity. He charged that Nevin’s unguarded language about union with Christ led the Mercersburg theologians to adopt a pantheistic “Pan-Christism” that obliterated the distinction between the human and the divine. From Dabney’s vantage point, Nevin’s incarnational theology seemed to entail the “substantive oneness” of divinity and humanity — an unthinkable conclusion. When he lectured on soteriology, Dabney carefully preserved the line of demarcation between the human and the divine. Specifically, he denied the suggestion, characteristic of Mercersburg, that Christ had taken generic human nature into union with himself in the course of his mediatorial work. The denial rested on Dabney’s belief that no reprobate sinners could participate in such a union. Since reprobate sinners obviously existed — and just as obviously possessed a human nature — it was inconceivable that the incarnation effected any union between the divine Christ and humanity-in-general. Conceiving of men and women as atomistic individuals, and affirming with the seventeenth century Synod of Dort that Christ’s atonement encompassed only a portion of mankind, Dabney refused to speak of the salvation of humanity in principle as a prelude to or basis for the actualized salvation of individuals. In Dabney’s view, in fact the incarnation did not involve any “substantial” union even between Christ and his elect; it simply established the basis for a “legal union.” That is, by assuming a specific human nature (as opposed to generic human nature) the Logos fulfilled the formal conditions required for the forensic act of imputation. Thus the distinction between man and God was fully maintained. (“Mercersburg, Princeton, and the South: The Sacramental Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Presbyterian History 54 (1976): 247–248.)
He charged that Nevin’s unguarded language about union with Christ led the Mercersburg theologians to adopt a pantheistic “Pan-Christism” that obliterated the distinction between the human and the divine. From Dabney’s vantage point, Nevin’s incarnational theology seemed to entail the “substantive oneness” of divinity and humanity — an unthinkable conclusion.I do find it curious that Horne nowhere mentions Holifield’s analysis anywhere in his paper. It isn’t even cited in the bibliography, which is particularly strange that Horne would not consult, let alone interact with, one of the very few scholarly discussions of the exact topic he is writing on available at that time, especially since it flatly contradicts the very case that Horne attempts to make.
That said, looking at Dabney’s comments and Holifield’s analysis, it seems that Horne’s conclusions regarding Dabney and Nevin’s supposed agreement on the issue of union with Christ is based on nothing more than wishful thinking.
But there is one more curious element to Horne’s representations that I want to explore.
In the last sentence of the very important final endnote, Horne generalizes the agreement between Nevin and Dabney on their views of union with Christ:
Nevertheless, despite their (Dabney and Nevin — P) differing conceptions of union with Christ, both seem to have a similar use for the doctrine in discussing imputation — that “This union effectuates redemption.” (emphasis added)That last phrase, “This union effectuates redemption”, is taken from the citation of Dabney’s lectures. Horne uses it to claim that Dabney and Nevin had a “similar use for the doctrine in discussing imputation.” Again, the “imputation” involved here is not Adam, the stated focus of Horne’s paper, but the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.
But exactly the opposite is true. Let’s look at Dabney again:
Now, I cannot but believe that the gross and extreme views of a real presence and opus operatum, in the Lord’s supper, which prevailed in the Church from the patristic ages throughout the mediaeval, and which infect the minds of many Protestants now, arise from an erroneous and overstrained view of the mystical union. This union effectuates redemption. (emphasis added)Here Dabney is not stating his agreement with Nevin’s view, but in fact he is actually rejecting it! When he uses the definite determiner “this union”, what union is he talking about? The answer immediately precedes the statement: “an erroneous and overstrained view of the mystical union”, which he later identifies with the “Mercersburg School” — meaning John Williamson Nevin. Dabney identifes as “erroneous and overstrained” the view that “this union effectuates redemption” — the very same view that Horne tells us that Nevin and Dabney share!
There is no language whatsoever in the passage Horne quotes or anywhere in the remote vicinity to turn this into a statement of agreement by Dabney with Nevin. The statement when read in context can only be taken to mean the opposite of what Horne represents it as. This should really call into question whether Horne understands what he is reading at all, or if he is so bound and determined to place Nevin within the pale of Reformed orthodoxy that he will manufacture the evidence out of whole cloth in order to do it. I will leave that question for him to answer, but it should immediately raise concerns about his ability to accurately represent the theological similarities and differences between John Williamson Nevin, Charles Hodge and Robert L. Dabney.
In conclusion:
- Horne gravely errs by attempting to make the leap from Nevin and Dabney’s roughly similar views on the imputation of Adam’s sin to make them advocating the same position on union with Christ, justification and imputation of Christ’s righteousness, especially when the evidence that even Horne himself cites (and conveniently buries in the final endnote) makes clear that Dabney radically rejects Nevin’s views at this very juncture.
- When the substance behind Horne’s first point of conclusion regarding the agreement between Nevin and Dabney (“Union with Christ is the basis for the justification of believers”) falls apart, the rest of his set of conclusions, which are inferentially drawn from it and are the ultimate conclusions of the entire paper, fall together with it.
- In order to cover up the fact of Dabney’s radical rejection of Nevin’s understanding of union with Christ, Horne entirely misrepresents a snippet of Dabney’s statement and makes him say exactly the opposite to get them both to some point of agreement regarding redemption. In fact, Dabney categorized Nevin’s views on union of Christ in the very quote that Horne cites as “gross and extreme” and “erroneous and overstrained”.
- Not only is Dabney NOT the source of vindication for Nevin’s Reformed credentials that Horne contends him to be, but Dabney in fact directly places Nevin and his views outside the Christian pale altogether, even going beyond Hodge in that regard by calling it “semi-Pantheism”.
- If Dabney’s alleged support was sufficient for Horne to vindicate Nevin’s Reformed credentials, now that the matter has been fully examined and Horne’s case about Dabney’s support for Nevin’s soteriology found wanting, the opposite should be acknowledged: Dabney stands with Hodge to evict Nevin and Mercersburg Theology from the pale of American Presbyterianism and Reformed Orthodoxy.
13 comments:
"The reason why I believe that Horne’s case is undermined entirely is that if Dabney “radically rejects” Nevin’s understanding of the union with Christ, not only does it eviscerate his conclusion in point 1 equating Dabney and Nevin's view of union with Christ and justification; it invalidates their supposed agreement drawn by inference from that in all the other concluding points as well."
This isn't right. Horne does not "equate" the views of Dabney and Nevin on union with Christ. He claims that they are similar in a few particular respects--i.e., that they both make union with Christ basic to justification, etc. The fact that Dabney and Nevin differ in important details of their respective formulations about what union with Christ exactly entails (particularly with regards to what is happening in the sacraments) in no way negates their basic agreement that union with Christ is the "basis" for justification (1); or that they both believe in a definitive moment of regeneration (2); or that they both believe in an integral connection between justification and sanctification (3); or that they both believe that the union with Christ and our union with Adam have certain parallels and differences (4-6); or that they both agree that our union with Christ is an essentially forensic matter (7).
Now, perhaps Dabney and Nevin simply don't agree on some or all of these points--perhaps Horne is simply incorrect. But you'll have to show that by looking at the individual points themselves. You cannot plausibly dismiss them a priori, simply because of some fault you find with point (1). And the fault you have claimed to find isn't a fault at all, anyway. The fact that Dabney and Nevin's views on union with Christ were not identical, in no way illegitimizes pointing out the ways in which they are similar.
You make much of Dabney's criticism of Nevin's view of the union with Christ--but that criticism is directed at Nevin's view of the sacraments (and did we all notice that Dabney also criticizes Calvin on this issue?). But Horne's paper isn't about the sacraments, it's about imputation. You started off your post by making sure we all understood that there is a lot more to M. Theo than just its view of the "imputation of Adam's sin", that there is a much wider gulf on a wider variety of issues between the M. Theologians and guys like Hodge. But then when Horne addresses one particular aspect of Nevin's theolgoy, you take this as a weakness. "There is oh so much more going on in M. Theology than just this!" Well, of course there is, but one thing at at a time, dude! (Not that Horne even wants to vindicate Nevin's entire theology, necessarily.)
Horne's paper is simply meant to be a vindication of Nevin on that one limited point of imputation--i.e., that Nevin's view is not unorthodox, nor does it have unorthodox implications by entailing the denial of forensic justification. This is all Horne is trying to show. All of his seven points at the end of his article are directed to this end. You yourself acknowledge that Horne seems to have gotten the basic positions of Dabney and Nevin on union with Christ and imputation correct, so what exactly is all the fuss, Patrick? That Dabney still differed with Nevin on other stuff that Horne doesn't go into? So what?
If you think that Horne is simply wrong in one or more of his 7 points, and that Dabney and Nevin simply don't agree on those points that Horne describes, then show where they disagree on those points. But showing that they disagree on the implications the mystical union with Christ has for sacramentology is a red herring.
Regarding the passage from Dabney in Horne's footnote, you write:
"Here Dabney is not stating his agreement with Nevin’s view, but in fact he is actually rejecting it! When he uses the definite determiner “this union”, what union is he talking about? The answer immediately precedes the statement: “an erroneous and overstrained view of the mystical union”, which he later identifies with the “Mercersburg School” – meaning John Williamson Nevin. Dabney identifes as "erroneous and overstrained" the view that "this union effectuates redemption" - the very same view that Horne tells us that Nevin and Dabney share!"
No offense, but this is a real howler. Dabney is worried that the M. Theology represents an "erroneous and overstrained view" of...of what? Of "the mystical union." What union is that? Next sentences: "This union effectuates redemption. We all agree that the sacraments are its signs and seals." Clearly, Dabney agrees that there is a mystical union which effectuates redemption, of which the sacraments are signs and seals.
(Fuller argument: Dabney says "we all agree" that the sacraments are its signs and seals. What is the reference of that pronoun "its"? It is clearly to the "this union" which effectuates redemption from the previous sentence. But what is the reference of "this" in "this union"? Well, in the sentence before that, Dabney claims that some people (the M. Theologians) have a problematic view of "the mystical union." This must be the union he is talking about when he says "this union" in the next sentence, and when he says that sacraments are "its" signs and seals in the sentence after that. Notice, furthermore, that he claims that these people have an erroneous view of the mystical union; he does not claim that they are in error simply for believing in a mystical union.)
Dabney thinks that the M. Theologians have an "erroneous and overstrained" view of this mystical union--i.e., they "take it too far" when they lay out their understanding of the sacraments. But that there is a mystical union which "effectuates" redemption is the clear interpretation of Dabney's words. (He just doesn't think it involves the kind of sacramentology put forth by Nevin.)
Xon,
Thanks for your comments. If it's true that his conclusion #1 doesn't stand (i.e. that Nevin and Dabney don't agree on the statement "union with Christ is the basis for the justification of believers"; Horne admits they don't agree on what "union with Christ" means), all of the others which are predicated on it can't stand either. Horne hasn't provided (in his paper at least) evidence to back those other remaining six conclusions up. There might be evidence elsewhere that Nevin and Dabney agree on these issues, but Horne nowhere provides evidence of such. And making the leap from their somewhat agreement on the imputation of Adam's sin to Nevin's entire scheme of soteriology doesn't cut it. The burden of proof is on Horne, not Poole.
You also state: "You make much of Dabney's criticism of Nevin's view of the union with Christ--but that criticism is directed at Nevin's view of the sacraments."
Horne can't have it both ways. Even he admits that Dabney isn't talking about just sacraments here; Dabney is criticizing Nevin's entire scheme of mystical union. Holifield also understands this. Remember, Dabney's lecture is entitled "Union with Christ", not "Mystical Union in the Sacraments". Is Dabney identifying Nevin/Mercersburg's "Pan-Christism" and "modern semi-Pantheism" solely on the basis of Nevin's view of the sacraments (which relies on his understanding of union with Christ)? Now that's a howler.
"If it's true that his conclusion #1 doesn't stand (i.e. that Nevin and Dabney don't agree on the statement "union with Christ is the basis for the justification of believers"; Horne admits they don't agree on what "union with Christ" means), all of the others which are predicated on it can't stand either."
I don't know that (2) - (7) are meant to be "predicated" on (1). It appears that Horne is simply listing out 7 positions concerning union with Christ and how it relates to salvation which he thinks that Dabney and Nevin both share. I don't mean this to be nit-picky.
But besides, his conclusion in #1 does stand, or at least you haven't shown how it doesn't. Dabney and Nevin do not have to agree on a full definition of "union with Christ" in order to agree that (a) there is such a union, and that (b) this union is basic to justification. This is all Horne asserts in (1): that Dabney and Nevin both assert (a) and (b).
"There might be evidence elsewhere that Nevin and Dabney agree on these issues, but Horne nowhere provides evidence of such. And making the leap from their somewhat agreement on the imputation of Adam's sin to Nevin's entire scheme of soteriology doesn't cut it. The burden of proof is on Horne, not Poole."
Two things here:
1. Are you saying that Horne tries to provide evidence that Dabney and Nevin both hold (1) - (7), but you think his evidence is bad/unconvincing, or are you saying that Horne does not even try to present such evidence? If the latter, then I'll have to read his article again and get back to you, to see for myself. If the former, then you do have a "burden of proof", in this very simple sense. Horne has given arguments for a position. If you think his arguments are bad, then you must present those arguments here and show where they have gone wrong. He tried to meet his "burden of proof" by, you know, writing the article. If you think his arguments fail, then the burden of proof is on you to show they fail. I don't mean this to sound preachy, though, and I'm sure you know this already.
Again, if Horne just says "they agree", then he has a burden to demonstrate that they agree. Once he offers arguments for his position, though, then the burden is on you to show that his arguments are insufficient (or perhaps to simply offer stronger arguments of your own for the contrary position).
2. Horne does not, from what I can tell, make a "leap" from D and N's "somewhat agreement" on imputation to "Nevin's entire scheme of soteriology." I'm sure there is a lot more to Nevin's soteriology than what Horne talks about in his paper. But the point, again, is this: Nevin's position on the relationship between imputation and justification appears to be within the pale of orthodoxy, and Hodge was wrong when he charged that Nevin's view entails (necessarily implies) a denial of forensic justification. There could be a whole lot of other stuff to Nevin's soteriology besides this, though.
"Horne can't have it both ways. Even he admits that Dabney isn't talking about just sacraments here; Dabney is criticizing Nevin's entire scheme of mystical union."
Okay, to be more precise, Dabney is criticizing Nevin's entire scheme (his charge of "pan-theism" surely cannot be anything but a condemnation of Nevin's entire religious belief system, as you say), but he is doing so because of the particular places where he thinks it really shows its rear-end. I don't think that Dabney thinks that every single tenet of 'Nevinism' is incorrect, right? But he thinks "the system" is erroneous, due to certain implications it has. And where do we see--according to the Dabney passage under discussion--those implications come out? In Nevin's view of the sacraments!
But all of this being said, the point can remain that Dabney does not object to, and even shares, Nevin's belief in (a) and (b) above. Furthermore, it can even be the case that Dabney and Nevin agree ("implicitly or explicitly") on all 7 of Horne's alleged points. But then Dabney could still turn around and think that Nevin's entire system is very dangerous, heretical, etc. There is no inconsistency between all of these being the case.
And, since there is no inconsistency between these three states of affairs (i.e., that D and N agree on (a) and (b); that they agree on (1) - (7); and that D thinks N is a woefully erroneous heretic), then you cannot prove Horne wrong by pointing to one of these states of affairs. If x, y, and z are all consistent, then you cannot disprove x and/or y by proving z.
I'm trying to make my thoughts clearer, but it might not be working?
Xon,
Horne doesn't list points 1-7 as positions, but as conclusions. He hasn't shown any agreement between Nevin and Dabney except the imputation of Adam's sin. That's a long way from his 7 conclusions, whether he wants to draw them "implicitly or explicitly". Contrary to your assertion, his paper doesn't provide evidence for these seven conclusions. The burden is on him, not me, to provide the evidence that Dabney acknowledged Nevin's view conformed to the Reformed understanding of forensic justification. Thus far, he has not.
And the evidence that even he acknowledges of Dabney rejecting Nevin's scheme of mystical union, calling it "pan-Christism" and "modern semi-pantheism". Do you really think at this point that Dabney would have agreed that Nevin's conception of "mysticial union" falls within the bounds of the Reformed idea of forensic justification?
Also, do you think that Holifield's analysis is also wrong? Wouldn't you agree that if Holifield is right, Horne's case is entirely undercut?
Patrick,
Saying that (a) Nevin's conception of "mystical union" falls outside the pale of orthodoxy, and that (b) Nevin's conception of "mystical union" falls outside of orthodoxy because it runs afoul of the Reformed idea of forensic justification, are not the same thing. Dabney certainly seems to believe (a), but not necessarily (b).
I'll try to come back to this tomorrow, I promise. For now, I'll leave with that.
"Also, do you think that Holifield's analysis is also wrong? Wouldn't you agree that if Holifield is right, Horne's case is entirely undercut?"
No, actually. There is no reason why Dabney cannot criticize Nevin in the ways Holifield describes, yet also agree with Nevin in the ways that Horne describes. I fail to see the inconsistency in accepting the historical work of both Holifield and Horne.
The fact that Dabney thinks that Nevin "pushes" our mystical union with Christ too far, even pushing it all the way to a 'pan-theistic' unification of Creator and creature, does not refute Horne's claim that Dabney and Nevin agreed on the following sorts of things:
1. That our mystical union with Christ is the basis of our justification.
2. That there is a definitive moment of regeneration.
.
.
.
7. That our union with Christ is an essentially forensic matter.
Dabney could agree with Nevin on all of these points, yet still think that Nevin's entire theological project (or just his notion of union with Christ) goes bad in other ways.
"Horne doesn't list points 1-7 as positions, but as conclusions. He hasn't shown any agreement between Nevin and Dabney except the imputation of Adam's sin. That's a long way from his 7 conclusions, whether he wants to draw them "implicitly or explicitly". Contrary to your assertion, his paper doesn't provide evidence for these seven conclusions."
Having just re-read Horne's paper, I think this is a misrepresentation. He clearly offers (1) - (7) at the end of his paper as a way of "summing up" what he thinks he has shown throughout the paper up to that point. Look again and see for yourself. Horne's arguments might not be good or convincing, but he does indeed go through writings of both Nevin and Dabney and tries to infer from those writings that both men would affirm (1) - (7). It simply is not the case that he simply puts those 7 points out there as conclusions with no argumentative support.
Also, Horne appears to have acknowledged Dabney's disagreements with Nevin much more clearly than you give him credit for. Not just in a footnote. Notice this passage from Horne's paper:
"One reason for believing that Nevin belongs to the debate within American Presbyterianism is that Dabney seems to have articulated substantially the same view of the imputation of Adam's sin. This is especially interesting because Dabney, 1) was a partisan to the same Common Sense Philosophy as Hodge, as opposed to Nevin's idealism; 2) publicly repudiated Calvin's doctrine of Christ's presence in the Lord's Supper; 3) considered the Mercersburg theology worthless;[39] and 4) is above reproach in loyalty to the Westminster Standards and Old-School Calvinism.[40]" (emphasis added)
(And, if you read his explanatory footnote 39, you will notice that Dabney refers to Mercersburg Theologians as an example of "advocates of the greatest theological absurdities," and then he mentions the particular doctrine that he finds so absurd. And that doctrine is...Nevin's doctrine of the sacraments! It is clearly the sacraments where Dabney thinks that Nevin's system goes wrong, not in its broad attempt to make union with Christ basic to justification (or any of the other 7 points Horne mentions in his paper).)
So, Horne even recognizes in his paper how stenuously Dabney disagreed with Nevin. But this only makes Horne's thesis all that much stronger--that there is something significant about the stuff that Dabney and Nevin agreed upon. Dabney was no friend of Nevin's and no enemy of Westminsterian orthodoxy, and yet he and Nevin line up on the sorts of things that Horne is discussing in his paper, which were some of the things that Hodge tried to use to put Nevin outside the pale of orthodoxy. Dabney appears to have agreed with Hodge that Nevin was outside the pale, but to have disagreed with these particular reasons Hodge gave for thinking so. On the question of union with Christ and its basicality to justification, as well as the other 6 points Horne mentions, Dabney and Nevin appear to be in agreement. This is all the more significant given how strongly Dabney disagreed with Nevin over all!
I'm sorry, Xon, but Horne doesn't marshal any evidence for his conclusions 1-7. The vast majority of the paper, with the exception of the last few paragraphs, deal exclusively with the imputation of Adam's sin. The rest does not follow "implicitly or explicitly" as he claims. He has nothing to "sum up" to conclude points 1-7. They are manufactured out of thin air and stand in contravention to the very evidence Horne tucks neatly and quietly into his last endnot.
And as for the points themselves, there is nothing there generally that even I would disagree with. Let's make it clear that Nevin and Mercersburg doesn't hold a monopoly on "mystical union". The argument as follows doesn't work:
1) Calvinistic theology holds to mystical union;
2) Nevin held a theology of mystical union;
Therfore, Nevin is part of Calvinistic theology.
I could also add on that same basis:
3) The Roman Catholic Church holds to a view of mystical union;
Therefore, the Roman Catholic Church is Calvinistic.
Both of these are fallacious, but that seems to be the reasoning that Horne is using.
However, Horne is trying to pound Nevin's view of mystical union into Reformed orthodoxy (which he admits is his stated intent) by using Dabney as the hammer. Except that Dabney makes it clear that he doesn't agree with Nevin on the very points in which Horne says that they do agree. I don't even have to go beyond the evidence Horne himself provides to demonstrate that. The only point at which they MIGHT even share agreement is on the imputation of Adam's sin.
So did Dabney hold to points 1-7? Sure he did. Did he hold them in the same way that Nevin does (as Horne claims)? Clearly he did not. Holifield is an added witness that Dabney is closer to Hodge than to Nevin on those very points. It really isn't as convoluted as you're trying to make it. Horne's case falls completely apart.
"And as for the points themselves, there is nothing there generally that even I would disagree with."
Given that you've said you agree with these seven points, and that Nevin and Dabney both held all of them, I won't bother to take up a detailed argument with citations from Horne's article showing that he did argue for these. You say he didn't argue for them, but then you say you agree with them any way. So I'm okay with moving on. To this:
"Let's make it clear that Nevin and Mercersburg doesn't hold a monopoly on "mystical union". The argument as follows doesn't work:
1) Calvinistic theology holds to mystical union;
2) Nevin held a theology of mystical union;
Therfore, Nevin is part of Calvinistic theology.
I could also add on that same basis:
3) The Roman Catholic Church holds to a view of mystical union;
Therefore, the Roman Catholic Church is Calvinistic.
Both of these are fallacious, but that seems to be the reasoning that Horne is using."
These simply are not the argument form that is being used here. We have to start with Hodge's accusation against Nevin. Hodge accused Nevin of being unorthodox because Nevin made union with Christ central to justification. Hodge also accused Nevin of being unorthodox because he said that this view on union with Christ entails a denial of forensic justification. Hodge also, of course, criticized Nevin on lots of other points, but these are the only two that Horne is trying to address in his article. So far so good?
Horne is trying to refute the argument used by Hodge (on these two points) against Nevin. He does so by arguing like this (notice how different it is from the form you impute to Horne's argument):
P1. Dabney is not unorthodox.
P2. Dabney makes union with Christ central to justification.
C1. Therefore, Nevin cannot be unorthodox simply for making union with Christ central to justification.
In regards to forensic justification, the argument would have a similar form. (Note, Horne offers more arguments than this. Most of his paper is a detailed analysis of Nevin's writings that makes no reference to Dabney at all. We could formulate several arguments from this major portion of Horne's paper that would have nothing to do with Nevin's similarity to Dabney. He brings Dabney in at the end, to show that Dabney and Nevin agree on these certain things. This similarity, and the argument Horne offers for it, is what we are discussing here.)
Note that the point of the argument is not simply that it is okay to "hold to a mystical union." It is that it is okay to make that mystical union central to justification. Reformed theology is not united in doing this, but it has historically allowed for people to do this within its walls. Two examples of people who have? Nevin and Dabney. If Nevin is unorthodox, it must be for other reasons unrelated to the fact that he makes union with Christ central to justification. But Hodge tries to pin him with unorthodoxy on this basis alone! (Again, Hodge also gives other bases, but Horne does not discuss those in his paper.) So, on this one issue, Nevin is okay, and Hodge is wrong to say he isn't. That's the argument.
"However, Horne is trying to pound Nevin's view of mystical union into Reformed orthodoxy (which he admits is his stated intent) by using Dabney as the hammer. Except that Dabney makes it clear that he doesn't agree with Nevin on the very points in which Horne says that they do agree. I don't even have to go beyond the evidence Horne himself provides to demonstrate that. The only point at which they MIGHT even share agreement is on the imputation of Adam's sin."
No, this is not Horne's stated or admitted intent, at least not in this paper. The point you agree they might (just 'might'? Earlier you said you had no problem with these 7 points. Do you have a problem with them, or don't you?) agree on, imputation (really, the hierarchy of importance to justification that is assigned to imputation and union with Christ, respectively) is the only point Horne is trying to show they agree on! So, again, what's the fuss.
"So did Dabney hold to points 1-7? Sure he did. Did he hold them in the same way that Nevin does (as Horne claims)? Clearly he did not. Holifield is an added witness that Dabney is closer to Hodge than to Nevin on those very points. It really isn't as convoluted as you're trying to make it. Horne's case falls completely apart."
Horne's case for what falls apart? His case for a similarity between Nevin and Dabney's views on the centrality of union with Christ to justification? Or his case for Nevin's entire mystical view being orthodox? If the former, then no it doesn't fall apart, as even you admit that D and N agree on 1-7, which is all Horne is talking about in his paper. (And saying that D. doesn't hold these points "in the same way" doesn't really make any sense. I honestly have no idea what you even mean by that. Would D and N both affirm 1-7, as stated, or wouldn't they? Is Hodge right to accuse N of unorthodoxy simply on the basis of N's holding to any/all of 1-7, or is he wrong to do so?) If the latter, then you are criticizing Horne's paper for failing to make an argument that it never pretended to make. In other words, you're fussing over nothing.
Xon, you're simply refusing to face the cold hard facts.
Was Horne trying to take his point that Dabney agreed with Nevin on imputation of Adam's sin (which I agree he made) to make them agree on Nevin's whole scheme of justification, union with Christ and imputation of Christ's righteousness? Let's let Horne speak for this himself:
"In summary, this paper has attempted to make a prima facie case that both Nevin and Dabney share a view at odds with the "immediate imputation" of Charles Hodge, but not, as Hodge claimed in the case of Nevin, at odds with notion of forensic justification. They (Nevin and Dabney) seem to have held, implicitly or explicitly, the following points in common against him (Hodge): (points 1-7 follow)
He immediately concludes:
The similarities (what similarities? Points 1-7 immediately preceding - P) between Nevin and Dabney, despite real differences in theological and philosophical perspective, should provide additional evidence that Nevin, whatever his faults, was not simply the quasi-romanist as which Hodge attempted to portray him.
You simply want to make less of what Horne says than even what he intended to do. If anything, Mark is an unambiguous man. I take him at face value on what he says. He says that Nevin and Dabney were in agreement on points 1-7. In fact, Nevin in Dabney were very much in disagreement on what points 1-7 meant.
When Dabney identified Nevin's views on these very points as "pan-Christism" and "modern semi-Pantheism", was Dabney expressing agreement with Nevin as Horne repeatedly claims? Is Dabney and Nevin standing against Hodge on Points 1-7 as Horne claims? Would Dabney have agreed with Horne's representations of his supposed agreement with Nevin on these points 1-7? The answer to all three questions is a very decided no. Again, Horne's case falls apart here.
But then you say:
"Given that you've said you agree with these seven points, and that Nevin and Dabney both held all of them, I won't bother to take up a detailed argument with citations from Horne's article showing that he did argue for these."
Nice sleight-of-hand. I would never say (nor did I, contrary to your claim) that Nevin held these points in common with Dabney or me. He clearly didn't. He did not belive in the imputation of Christ's righteousness (he believed in implantation); he did not believe in forensic justification; and he held to a pagan view of union with Christ. This is where Holifield comes in to say that Dabney DID NOT agree with Nevin on these points, and that he stood with Hodge AGAINST Nevin at these very points, which contradicts the very case that both you and Horne are trying to make.
And the simple reason that you won't "bother to take up a detailed argument with citations from Horne's article showing that he did argue for these" is because they simply aren't there. I certainly understand your unwillingness to provide the evidence. But until you are willing to show me that evidence of agreement from Horne's paper between Nevin and Dabney on points 1-7 (beyond Horne's bald assertions) to show me the error of my ways, I'm not sure we're going to make an headway in our little discussion here.
This is a long comment, and for that I apologize.
Horne says early in the section of his paper devoted to discussing Hodge's criticism of Nevin:
"However, because the issues raised are predominately sacramental, other aspects of theology involved in the discussion have received relatively scant attention. Despite Nevin's attempts to defuse the issue, one of Hodge's major accusations is that he denies both the Reformed doctrine of justification and that of Original Sin, by denying imputation."
We see here that Horne clearly zeroes in on one particular criticism (or one bundle of criticisms, at any rate) that Hodge made against Nevin. Horne is not discussing the entire Hodgean case against Nevin, but only Hodge's argument that Nevin's view of imputation/union with Christ was, in itself, unorthodox.
This means that, if Horne is wrong, it will be because he either:
i.. misidentifies what Hodge's criticism is on this point (i.e., Hodge's argument is actually different than the way Horne presents it)
ii. misrepresents what Nevin's position actually is on this point (of imputation/union with Christ). Perhaps Hodge's criticism against Nevin is right on target, but Horne doesn't see this because he misunderstands what Nevin's position actually is
iii. correctly characterizes both Hodge's criticism as well as Nevin's position, but commits some logical error in his analysis. Perhaps he commits some fallacy in his own arguments, and this causes him to "refute" Hodge's criticism of Nevin in an unconvincing way.
Notice that Horne cannot be shown to be wrong simply by pointing out all the other ways, besides imputation/union w/ Christ, that Hodge disagreed with Nevin. Horne's paper is not about those criticisms offered by Hodge, as he makes clear in the passage cited above.
Similarly, when Horne argues that Dabney and Nevin actually agree with (i.e., they both assent to) the seven positions he mentions, he cannot be shown wrong by arguing that really Dabney and Nevin were radically different in their overall theological approach. (Everyone knows this, including Horne, who admits it in more than one place in his paper) In fact, he cannot even be shown wrong by arguing that Dabney and Nevin differed significantly in their overall views of imputation and the nature of our union with Christ. He nowhere argues that they are in lock-step agreement on these issues—only that they agree on the seven positions he mentions. (And, again, this is only part of his argument on behalf of Nevin in his paper; he also tries to show Hodge’s critique of Nevin’s views of imputation/union with Christ/justification fails by simply appealing to Nevin's own writings without mentioning Dabney at all)
To show that Horne’s “similarity” argument is mistaken, a critic must show at least one of the following:
a. Dabney and Nevin do not each assent to all seven of the positions Horne attributes to them (this would require a positive argument on your part, from the writings of one or both men, demonstrating their disagreement), or
b. Horne’s own arguments that they DO agree are not good arguments (or he simply doesn’t give any arguments at all) (this is a more modest claim than (a), and would require you only to critique Horne’s positive arguments for a similarity between D and N on the 7 points—you would simply need to show that Horne’s argument(s) fails, and thus that his conclusion that D and N were significantly similar on these issuses is, thus far, unsupported), or
c. Though D and N do indeed agree on Horne’s seven points, those points are simply not relevant to Hodge’s criticism of Nevin’s doctrine of imputation/union with Christ/justification. (Really, going this route would be conceding that Horne’s “similarity” argument is good, but arguing that this argument is not an appropriate response to Hodge’s criticism of Nevin (and so would really be a part of arguing either i, ii, or iii above)
In your last comment you made comments along the lines of (a) (“I would never say (nor did I, contrary to your claim) that Nevin held these points in common with Dabney or me. He clearly didn't.”). This was very puzzling, as you had earlier asserted (in comment #8) that you agreed with the 7 points yourself. (“And as for the points themselves, there is nothing there generally that even I would disagree with.”) You also asserted at the end of that comment “So did Dabney hold to points 1-7? Sure he did.” So, Dabney held to 1-7, by your own words. But then you go on to say, “Did he hold them in the same way that Nevin does (as Horne claims)? Clearly he did not. Holifield is an added witness that Dabney is closer to Hodge than to Nevin on those very points. It really isn't as convoluted as you're trying to make it. Horne's case falls completely apart.” I pointed out how unclear this paragraph was already in comment #9, but you have chosen to dismiss my concerns here as “sleight-of-hand.” Yet here we are, and things aren’t much clearer. What on earth do you mean when you say that Dabney “holds’ to 1-7, just like Nevin, but that he holds them “in a different way” than Nevin did? You either assent to propositions or you don’t. D and N either both assent to (1)-(7), or they don’t.
Charitably, we can take your point to be that Nevin and Dabney had very different reasons for holding (1)-(7). If we were to list out all the related positions that they used to ‘get to’ (1)-(7), then we would see some very different lists between the two of them. This might be true, but it is completely irrelevant to Horne’s argument. Horne’s point is simply that they agree on (1)-(7), and that their agreement on those 7 points refutes a particular criticism of Hodge against Nevin (namely, that Nevin’s making union with Christ basic to his understanding of justification entailed, in itself, that Nevin was outside the pale of Reformed orthodoxy, particularly because it led him to deny the forensic aspects of justification.) Horne thinks that showing their agreement on (1) – (7) is sufficient to refute Hodge’s charge against Nevin—it does not matter how much they disagreed on other positions related to (1) – (7). Perhaps you could make your criticism clearer by actually offering an argument of your own that Horne is wrong here, that something about the way they disagree in the way they “get” to (1) – (7) means that Hodge’s criticism (just the one Horne is talking about in his paper, remember) is correct after all. But you haven’t offered any such argument. You have simply asserted that D and N don’t hold to the 7 points “in the same way.” But this isn’t, by itself, incompatible with Horne’s claim that they do in fact both hold to the 7 points, and as things stand Horne’s argument seems reasonable—their agreement on those 7 points, simpliciter, seems to throw the validity of Hodge’s criticism of Nevin (just the one Horne is talking about in his paper) into doubt. Without any argument on your part that there is some dissimilarity in their views which is significant to the matter at hand and which is sufficient to vindicate Hodge’s criticism (without also casting Dabney into the outer pit along with Nevin), this bald claim that they don’t hold the 7 points “in the same way” is unconvincing.
So much then for (a) as you have expressed it so far. But really your primary argument seems to be (b), that Horne has not met his burden of proof in showing that D and N agreed on his seven points. In fact, you have claimed repeatedly that Horne does not even offer arguments in this regard. I claimed he does, but I didn’t want to get into a blow-by-blow. You then implied that I was just being disingenuous, and that I obviously know that Horne in fact has no such arguments. I offer the following as a very brief but common sense analysis of Horne’s paper in order to answer your charge.
In his brief section on Dabney, Horne writes the following as his second paragraph:
”Dabney declared the immediate imputation articulated by Hodge to be groundless.[41] For one, Hodge's strict parallelism between the two Adams (argued especially from Rom 5.12-21) entailed either a denial of human depravity or of justification by faith. For, if the imputation of Christ's righteousness is related to our actual regeneration as Hodge claimed the imputation of Adam's sin is related to our actual corruption, then justification causes regeneration--which means either that unregenerate men can produce saving faith or that justification precedes faith.[42] Thus, Hodge's accusation against all who disagree with him as espousing "the popish theory of justification,"[43] virtually the same accusation which he made against Nevin, does not seem all that cogent to Dabney.”
Horne then goes on to cite more Dabney (the paragraph ending with endnote #45), and to explain what he has just cited thus: “The importance of this for Dabney is to show that the union we have with Adam is not a legal fiction but depends on an actual natural union.” This section consists of a summary of Dabney’s views (with citations from Dabney himself), and seems to be directly relevant to establishing that Dabney held Horne’s points (1) and (7). The citation of Dabney’s own words lend at least implicit support that Dabney would assent to (2) and (3).
In the paragraph that ends with endnote #48, we see Dabney contrasting our union with Christ and our union with Adam, and we see that the union with Adam is “by ordinary generation” (and the clear implication is that our union with Christ is by “extraordinary”, i.e., spiritual, generation). This clearly provides an argument that Dabney assents to Horne’s points (4) (5) and (6).
In the penultimate paragraph of his Dabney section, Horne writes:
”Previous to his existence in Adam, he has no innocent existence personally, not for one moment, not even in the metaphysical order of thought, for he has no actual existence at all. He enters existence corrupted, as he enters it guilty. He enters it guilty, as he enters it corrupted. This is the character of the federal union between him and Adam: that Adam's conduct should determine for his posterity precisely this result, namely, that their personal existence should absolutely begin in that moral estate and under that legal relation which Adam procured for himself; that the two elements of this result should be mutually involved and coetaneous, as they were personally in Adam.[49]”
This provides more confirmation, at least, that Dabney would assent to (6) and (7). I’ll leave it to the reader (Patrick and anyone else) to read all of these passages for themselves and see how they are clearly intended as arguments that Dabney would assent to Horne’s 7 points.
Now, Horne’s argumentation might not be very good. Perhaps he is misunderstanding the portions of Dabney he cites, etc. But to claim that he simply offers no argumentation that Dabney and Nevin agree on (1) – (7) is obviously false.
A quick note on my own background in all this. I have never read a word of Nevin or Schaff. I only know about Mercersburg Theology in the broadest terms, though I admit to respecting the current folks who are sympathetic to it. I had never read Horne’s paper until I read your post, Patrick. I am not an “apologist for Horne” here, so much as a moderately careful reader who can see that your criticisms of Horne’s paper are not cogent. You have repeatedly misrepresented what his argument even is, and when this has been pointed out to you (and an alternative explanation of his argument has been presented), you have simply ignored the criticism. You have dug in your heels and claimed that such criticisms are disingenuous, a failing to come to grips with the cold hard facts, etc. You have badly misinterpreted passages both from Dabney (see comment #2, to which you offered no substantive response—pointing out what you think is a “howler” that I have committed is no way to refute my earlier claim that you committed a howler) and from Horne’s paper. For instance, you again misread Horne’s basic argument in your most recent comment (#10), when you write:
”He immediately concludes:
The similarities (what similarities? Points 1-7 immediately preceding - P) between Nevin and Dabney, despite real differences in theological and philosophical perspective, should provide additional evidence that Nevin, whatever his faults, was not simply the quasi-romanist as which Hodge attempted to portray him
You simply want to make less of what Horne says than even what he intended to do.”
Presumably what you mean here is that when Horne says that Nevin was “not simply the quasi-romanist as which Hodge attempted to portray him”, that he is vindicating everything about Nevin’s overall theological approach. As you said earlier (in comment #8), “Horne is trying to pound Nevin's view of mystical union into Reformed orthodoxy…” So you believe that Horne’s desire is to get Nevin’s entire view of mystical union, a view which Dabney obviously disagreed with in many fundamental respects, to be accepted by Reformed people without a fuss.
Well, this might be Horne’s overall project, and it might even be a project worth criticizing. (I don’t know, like I said, I’m not particularly familiar with M Theology) But it is not his project in this paper. In this paper, Horne is not talking about the entire corpus of M Theology, or Nevin’s entire theology of the mystical union with Christ. All Horne is talking about is Hodge’s criticism that says that Nevin is unorthodox simply because Nevin denies Hodge’s view of “immediate imputation” (i.e., Nevin makes union with Christ central to justification, rather than imputation) and that this further entails that Nevin denies forensic justification. This is obviously the context in which Hornes says that Nevin is not “the quasi-Romanist as which Hodge attempted to portray him.” Obviously Horne is not saying that every criticism Hodge ever lodged against Nevin is bad. He may believe that, but it’s not his claim in this paper. With regard to Hodge’s attempt to portray Nevin as a quasi-Romanist with respect to the way he makes union with Christ central to justification, Horne is saying that Nevin is not a quasi-Romanist in that way. Your suggestion is that Horne is actually just leaping from a focused rebuttal of one particular Hodgean argument against Nevin to an all-out legitimization of everything Nevin represents. Such an interpretation is uncharitable to Horne (and, frankly, to the PCA, which oversaw the peer-reviewing of his paper and decided it was worthy of the award it received), and unwarranted by the paper itself. Horne makes it clear throughout that he is focusing on one particular kind of criticism that Hodge made against Nevin. When at the end he says that Nevin was not the quasi-Romanist Hodge portrayed him as, he must be referring to the particular Hodgean argument he has just spent the whole paper refuting. He is not trying to vindicate all things Nevin in one fell swoop.
Again, you misrepresent things when you write:
”When Dabney identified Nevin's views on these very points as "pan-Christism" and "modern semi-Pantheism", was Dabney expressing agreement with Nevin as Horne repeatedly claims? Is Dabney and Nevin standing against Hodge on Points 1-7 as Horne claims? Would Dabney have agreed with Horne's representations of his supposed agreement with Nevin on these points 1-7? The answer to all three questions is a very decided no. Again, Horne's case falls apart here.”
Again, when we look back at the passage from Dabney in which he accuses Nevin of “pan-Christism”, he is referring to the way that Nevin’s view of the mystical union with Christ led him to take a “real presence” view of the Supper. (This is all right there in Horne’s endnote 51.) You interpret this as though Dabney thought that Nevin was committing the error of “pan-Christism” when he affirmed 1-7. But obviously this is not so, as you yourself, Patrick, say that you don’t have any problem with 1-7. You say that Dabney also affirmed 1-7. So obviously it is not “pan-Christism” simply to assent to 1-7. Ah yes, but you say that something about the “way” that Nevin assented to them makes him a “pan-Christist.” This is not at all what Dabney says in the passage Horne cites, but even if were, this would not rebut Horne’s argument. All Horne is saying is that Nevin and Dabney both affirmed 1-7. It does not matter “how” they affirmed them, so long as they both affirmed them. Their simple agreement, Horne argues, shows that it is not automatically unorthodox to make union with Christ basic to justification, as Nevin does.
But, of course, Nevin may be problematic in a whole number of other ways.
This is far too long, but it is also my “signing off” to this conversation thread. Feel free to get in the last word (it is your blog, after all). I’ll leave my comments as they are, for any reader to judge whether or not you have been fair to Horne in the critique you have offered here.
Again, Xon, even Horne admits that Dabney is talking about Nevin's understanding of union with Christ in a soteriological sense, not just sacramentally. Just read Horne's Conclusion #1 and the beginning of his endnote #51:
"1. Union with Christ [51] is the basis for the justification of believers."
"51. Dabney radically rejected Nevin's understanding of that union, however. He wrote:... (begin Dabney quote)"
And after concluding the Dabney quote, Horne says further: "Nevertheless, despite their differing conceptions of union with Christ, both seem to have a similar use for the doctrine in discussing imputation--that 'This union effectuates redemption.'"
Let's also remember the title of Dabney's lecture cited: "Union with Christ".
This is the second time that I've called you on this fact (though I did think you're previous "Let me be more precise..." diversion in response the first time around was much more subtle). Why can't you admit this very basic fact? The answer is, of course, that your argument falls as completely apart at this point, as does Horne's. I might disagree with Horne, but at least he is willing to begrudgingly concede the point, which damages his case. You're unable to go that far. If you're not even willing to concede the painfully obvious, I don't see any profit from either of us continuing the discussion until you get a better grip on the facts.
Actually, I emailed Mark about my article as soon as I posted it. He acknowledged my email, but has as of yet bothered to publicly acknowledge my criticisms, let alone answer them. Like the monster under the bed, if you ignore it long enough, maybe it will go away. Honestly, I doubt that this is an honest mix-up or my misunderstanding of his position. Mark and I see the Christian faith in very, very different ways, and I think he would agree that we don't see things the same way. He thinks that Nevin's Hegelian pantheism is a perfectly acceptable option for Reformed believers and an expression of true Christian faith; much like Dabney, Hodge, etc., I don't.
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